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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAW-DENIAL OF COUNSEL AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADE-
QUATE WARNINGS REGARDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS HAVE IMPORTANT
BEARING ON CONFESSIONS WHICH ARE TESTED UNDER THE TOTALITY OF CIR-
CUMSTANCES.
John Herbert Greenwald was arrested on suspicion of burglary at 10:45
on the night of January 20, 1965. He was taken to a police station, questioned
until midnight, then booked and fingerprinted. At 2:00 A.M. the next morning
he was taken to a cell in the city jail. A plank attached to the wall served as
his bed but he did not sleep. At 6:00 A.M. he was left in a "bull pen" for two
and one half hours before being placed in a lineup. At 8:45 A.M. questioning,
conducted by several officers in a small room, was resumed. For several hours
Greenwald refused to answer any questions except to deny his guilt. He re-
fused to write out a confession, stating that "it was against (his) constitutional
rights," adding that he was "entitled to a lawyer." The statement evoked no
response and was not repeated. Between 11:00 A.M. and 11:30 A.M. peti-
tioner made a number of oral admissions and a full oral confession which was
reduced to writing about 1:00 P.M. Petitioner received no warning as to his
constitutional rights until after the oral confession and just prior to its re-
duction to writing. During this same brief period petitioner was offered food
and taken to his home to change clothes.
Greenwald, nearly thirty, had a ninth grade education and was no stranger
to the criminal law. He suffered from high blood pressure for which he took
medication twice daily. None was available to him from the time of his arrest
until his brief return home the following day. Petitioner testified that he con-
fessed because he "knew they weren't going to leave (him) alone until (he)
did."
Petitioner's conviction of two counts of burglary and one of attempted
burglary was affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.1 The Supreme Court
of the United States, in a 6 to 3 per curiam opinion, reversed, holding, that con-
sidering the totality of circumstances it was not credible that the statements
were a product of petitioner's free and rational choice. Greenwald v. Wisconsin,
390 U.S. 519 (1968).
The law of confessions has changed markedly since the 1500's when state-
ments were freely admitted without regard to the circumstances or methods
of extraction.2 During the next two centuries a greater importance was placed
on individual rights as the populace became increasingly aware of the use of
physical brutality towards suspected criminals. Nevertheless, confessions were
rarely excluded, even in the late 1700's unless elicited by promise, threat or
physical abuse.
In the early 1800's significant change took place in the thinking of the
1. 35 Wis. 2d. 146, 150 N.W.2d 507 (1967).
2. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, §§818-820 (3d ed. 1940).
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courts. Confessions were viewed with increased suspicion and were generally
excluded because law enforcement agencies continued to disregard individual
rights. 3 The common law rationale was that a confession would be excluded
when it was untrustworthy. Confessions were regarded as untrustworthy in
situations involving threats, violence or a promise of favorable treatment. Under
these circumstances it was likely that a suspect would confess rather than
suffer under continued fear or physical abuse. A promise of favorable treatment
worked the same way. An innocent suspect might confess to receive a lighter
sentence rather than risk a harsher result in a trial he might lose. Confessions
elicited under these circumstances were held to be involuntary because there
was a high probability that they might be untrue.4
In the United States the admissibility of a confession was measured by
its reliability for quite some time.5 In Brown v. MississippiG the Supreme
Court introduced the criterion under which confession could be excluded if it
was extracted in a manner which denied due process to an accused. Thereafter,
confessions were excluded on both grounds, untrustworthiness and denial of
due process, although the trend was toward the latter.7
The last vestige of the common law rationale was discarded in Rogers V.
Richmond when the Supreme Court announced:
[W]hether . . .confessions were admissible into evidence was
answered by reference to a legal standard which took into account the
circumstances of probable truth or falsity. And this is not a permissible
standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The attention of the trial judge should have been focused .. .on the
question whether the behavior... was such as to ... bring about con-
fessions not freely self-determined-a question to be answered with
complete disregard of whether or not petitioner spoke the truth.8
Involuntary confessions are still excluded but the criterion is now due process,
not reliability 9
3. Id. § 865. Physical coercion had nearly disappeared, but an accused had few of the
rights he has today. There was no right of appeal, no right to counsel, no right to testify
for oneself, and cross-examination of witnesses was allowed only by custom.
4. Id. § 822 and § 865.
5. Wilson v. U.S., 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896), "[Tlhe true test of admissibility is that
the confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any
sort."; Note, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 396 (1958).
6. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
7. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941):
The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily
made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine whether the in-
ducement to speak was such that there is a fair risk the confession is false. These
vary in the several states. . . .But the adoption of the rule of (the state's] choice
cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case, the application of that rule
works a deprivation of the prisoner's life or liberty without due process of law.
The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false
evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether
true or false.
Note, 35 U. Colo. L. Rev. 256 (1963).
8. 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961).
9. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
RECENT CASES
There is no single test which is adequate to determine if a confession is
voluntary. Each case is sui generis, with the court examining the factual context.
Some situations are so coercive that a confession is inadmissible as a matter of
law. Such a situation results when a confession is physically coerced by the use
or threat of violence.10 A similar situation, one more difficult to resolve, occurs
when the confession is psychologically induced.' As interrogation processes and
other police methods grow more sophisticated, the problem facing the court
becomes more complex. In an attempt to overcome this problem and to keep
pace with refinements in interrogation methods the courts must use a more sub-
jective test to determine the presence of a coercive atmosphere. 12 It is clear
that a court must give its attention to all the circumstances surrounding the
confession. 3 In Some cases coercion may be found from a single fact. In others,
all the facts (the totality of circumstances) may indicate coercion even when
no single fact is necessarily paramount in the decision.14 Under the concept of
The ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test
in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness .... If
it is ["voluntary"] the use of [a] confession offends due process.
For an excellent treatment of the subject of confessions, see 79 Harv. L. Rev. 935 (1966).
10. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (Threatened that lynch mob was outside) ;
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (Held in room while stripped to humiliate
and frighten, threatened by physical violence); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)
(Slapped by constable, moved between three different jails to create fear of mob violence) ;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (Questioned by 4 to 10 man teams of police and
irate citizens); Brown v. Mississippi, note 6 supra (Hung twice and whipped).
11. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (Accused told she could lose her children
if convicted); Culombe v. Connecticut, note 9 supra (Moron, known to be subject to
intimidation. Fear of codefendant and pressure from wife used to induce confession) ; People
v. Spano, 4 N.Y.2d 256, rev'd. 360 U.S. 315 (1958) (Lifelong friend who was a police officer
induced confession by trickery).
12. Some of the factors considered are illustrated in Davis v. North Carolina, 384
U.S. 737 (1966) (Low mental intellect, held incommunicado during 16 days of questioning) ;
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (Illiterate questioned by relays of officers
for 12 hours at a time in cubicle stifling with heat); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949), (Unlawful delay in arraignment); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (15 year
old held incommunicado and questioned 4 to 5 hours at a time by 5 to 6 police).
13. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963), "[Cloercion or improper induce-
ment can be determined only by an examination of all the attendant circumstances.";
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 64 (1951), "A confession can be declared inadmissible...
only when the circumstances under which it is received violate those fundamental principles
of liberty and justice protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S.
574, 583 (1884), "The admissibility of [a confession] so largely depends upon the special
circumstances connected with the confession. . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
14. Haynes v. Washington, note 13 supra at 514.
[T]estimony . . . permits no doubt that it was obtained under a totality of
circumstances evidencing an involuntary written admission of guilt.
Culombe v. Connecticut, note 9 supra, at 606.
[J]udgement as to legal voluntariness . . . under the Due Process Clause is
drawn from the totality of the relevant circumstances ....
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, '197 (1947).
The totality of circumstances that precede the confession in this case goes
beyond the allowable limit.
Brain v. U.S., 168 U.S. 532, 563 (1897).
[T]hese facts may not, when isolated each from the other, be sufficient to
warrant the inference that an influence compelling a statement had been exerted,
yet when taken as a whole . . . they give room to the strongest inference [that
they were not freely made].
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totality of circumstances, the court reviews the whole record and all the facts in
each case. 15 This is most significant, because the findings of fact are often no
more than the judicial inferences of the trier of fact. To restrict the concept of
totality of circumstances to findings of fact alone would prevent the reviewing
court from drawing its own conclusions about the force of the circumstances on
the personality of the accused. 6
It has been said that
... [O]nly one with an extravagant faith in the actual operation of
the 'totality of circumstances' test could fail to see that the safeguards
were largely illusory.17
It is extremely difficult to determine what constitutes a departure from proper
practice and when any combination of factors would result in an inadmissible
confession. A review of all the cases helps little in determining which of a
group of circumstances is considered to be most important. Many of the decisions
come from a divided Court and often there has been no majority opinion. The
lack of any consensus in the Supreme Court is indicative of the inadequacy
and uncertainty under the totality of circumstances test. Each case tends to
become a matter of personal conviction rather than a matter of law based on
judicial precedents.
In Escobedo v. Illinois1s and Miranda v. Arizona'9 the Supreme Court
adopted a different test for admissible confessions. These cases delineated the
minimum procedural requirements to satisfy due process. Escobedo held that
if a particular suspect, in custody, requests and is denied counsel and is not
effectively warned of his constitutional rights, then no statement elicited from
him may be used against him at criminal trial. Miranda, in reaffirming the
Escobedo decision, broadened its scope in two significant ways. First, the de-
fendent need not be in custody but only deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. Second, the use of statements no longer depends on the
request and denial of counsel but on the lack of a proper warning as to one's
constitutional rights which must be given prior to any questioning.
15. Lisenba v. California, note 7 supra at 237-38.
[Wihere the claim is that the prisoner's statement has been procured by [threats
or promises] . . . we are bound to make an independent examination of the record
.T]his duty [to examine the whole record] cannot be foreclosed by the findings
of a court or the verdict of a jury or both.
19 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 35 (1962).
16. Culombe v. Connecticut, note 9 supra, 605-06.
[T]he mental state of involuntariness upon which the due process question turns
can never be affirmatively established other than circumstantially ... and it cannot
be competent to the trier of fact to preclude our review simply by declining to
draw inferences which the historical facts compel ....
... [I]f force has been applied, this court does not leave to local determination
whether or not the confession was voluntary .... [Tihere comes a point where this
Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.
17. 65 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 62.
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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If counsel is offered when the proceedings become accusatorial, then the
accused will be better protected from denial of due process. In other words, the
presence of counsel during the interrogation will help to eliminate much of the
coercive character of the circumstances which used to surround a confession.
The instant case is one in which the confession was excluded on the basis
of totality of circumstances. The decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
reversed on the petition for the writ of certiorari without giving the State the
opportunity to brief or argue the question on the merits.20
Greenwald's trial took place in 1965, thus the Miranda decision did not
apply.21 Although the trial took place after Escobedo the Court chose not to
ground its opinion on that case itself. The majority, considering only undisputed
facts, found that Greenwald had lacked counsel and although he had mentioned
a lawyer one had not been formally requested. In addition the Supreme Court
considered that there had been an inadequate warning as to constitutional
rights. These facts, coupled with petitioner's physical condition as a result of
the lack of food, sleep and medication were considered to be relevant to the
claim that the confession was involuntary.
The dissent viewed the circumstances differently, noting that the time
period was just over 24 hours, during which there was questioning for less than
four hours on one day and a little more than one hour on the other. There was
no evidence of any threat or abuse, and no benefits were promised to induce the
confession. Petitioner was not inexperienced in matters of criminal law. He
was well aware of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent, and
he knew that his statements could be used against him. At no time did he request
either food or medication. The dissent also noted that Greenwald's petition did
not raise the question of whether his confession was admissible under Escobedo.
Greenwald is a case which is easily distinguished from those relied on by
the majority of the Court. It seems to present a marginal factual situation for
the exclusion of a confession under totality of circumstances standards. This
is not to say that the relevant circumstances could not be coercive, but rather
that to infer coercion as a matter of law is questionable. Even allowing for
differences in judicial opinion it is hard to find a case similar to Greenwald
in which the confession was inadmissible.
Clewis v. Texas,2 2 cited by the majority, presents far more typical and
compelling circumstances for a reversal of a conviction. In Clewis, as in many
others before it, the defendant was an uneducated Negro accused of a capital
crime in a southern state. The specific design was to elicit a confession by pro-
longed and protracted interrogation over a nine day period under trying condi-
tions. Lack of food and sleep were a natural by-product of the duration of the
interrogation. The accused, who appeared sick, was held for the whole time
20. 390 U.S. 519, 522 (1968).
21. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); (decided that Escobedo and Miranda
were not to be applied retroactively.).
22. 386 U.S. 707 (1967).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
with neither the advice of counsel nor the support of friend until broken in
spirit and resistance. Arraignment was delayed unlawfully until the accused
had made an inculpatory statement. Clewis, of course, was not warned of his
constitutional rights until after he confessed.
Greenwald was in custody for a little more than 12 hours during which he
was questioned twice, the maximum duration being less than four hours. There
is no evidence of a specific intent to coerce a confession and Greenwald's dis-
comforts were hardly severe. He had one sleepless night resulting from the
modest sleeping facilities in the jail. His lack of medication was his own fault
for he asked for none and did not advise the police of his illness. It is hard to
see how the police could have avoided depriving Greenwald of medicine when
they had no knowledge of his need.
Petitioner was not given breakfast by the police and received no food until
he confessed. While this fact weighs in the petitioner's favor it is difficult to
equate the absence of a single meal with an involuntary confession.
The majority considered that Greenwald had no adequate warning as to
his constitutional rights and lacked counsel after a statement that he desired
one. These two factors themselves would have mandated a reversal if the case
at bar had occurred after Miranda.
-2 3
In the pre-Escobedo era, denial of counsel and adequate warnings as to
rights were just two elements considered in the totality of circumstances. The
trier of fact would have to decide if an accused were prejudiced or intimidated
by these circumstances. In similar situations confessions made by persons ex-
perienced in the criminal law have been admitted, notwithstanding the denial
of counsel, even after a formal request had been made.2 4 It is likely that the
conviction in the instant case would have been affirmed under prior rationale
since Greenwald was well aware of his rights, familiar with police practices, and
did not formally request a lawyer.
Even though petitioner's trial occurred after Escobedo, the Court noted
that they "need not and do not decide whether [Escobedo] would in itself
require reversal."2 5 Accordingly, the Supreme Court implied that the findings of
the lower court were correct and that Greenwald's reference to a lawyer was
not sufficient to be considered a request for counsel so as to bring the instant
case within the holding of Escobedo .26 It is difficult to see why they felt the
lower court exercised good judgment in this regard but erred in its judgment
that the confession was voluntary. Little is gained by avoiding one question in
favor of the other especially when both are equally difficult questions of judg-
ment. A reversal on totality of circumstances grounds is no more supportable
23. See note 21 supra.
24. Cicenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958) and Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433
(1958), which were the law until Mirafnda, note 19 supra, at 479 n.48.
25. 390 U.S. 519 n.1 and 2 (1968).
26. 150 N.W. 2d 509, 510, 511. (Undisputed that petitioner never formally requested
counsel although his reference to a lawyer was close to a request. Escobedo holding was
limited to the specific case where counsel was requested and denied.)
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than one which might have found that Greenwald's statement was a request
for counsel.
The dissent suggests that petitioner did not cite Escobedo and therefore
the majority was wrong to consider it in its opinion. The Supreme Court should
not be prevented from arriving at a proper decision because of an error or
omission of citation especially in a case such as this where a layman prepared
the petition for the writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court should always be free
to cite the law of the land independent of the erudition and diligence of the
adversaries. Certainly a court which can make an independent examination of
the record to determine whether a confession is voluntary cannot be prevented
from making a determination of the law independent of the accuracy of the
petition. The days when cases were won and lost by the skill in preparing the
pleadings has long since past.
It must be concluded that Escobedo played a major role in the decision,
even though the Court couched its opinion in traditional totality of circumstances
language. The case shows how far the Escobedo and Miranda decisions in-
fluenced the application of the totality of circumstances test even though those
decisions were not directly applicable. Thus it may well be that the totality of
circumstances test has been liberalized in the light of these decisions and that
confessions will be more easily excluded when Miranda and Escobedo do not
apply directly. In other words it appears that the Supreme Court will consider
more closely the denial of counsel and failure to provide an adequate warning
about constitutional rights in cases which arise between the decisions in
Escobedo and Miranda. Even though these decisions are not to be applied
retroactively they may have important bearing on confessions which are tested
under the totality of circumstances standard.
EDWIN H. WOLF
LABOR LAW-PLANT REMOVAL-EMPLOYEES HAVE No RIGHT To
REEMPLOYMENT AT NEW PLANT SITE BASED ON SENIORITY
Throughout the 1950's the Lux Manufacturing Company1 periodically re-
moved departments from its Waterbury, Connecticut plant to its other plants
in Lebanon, Tennessee, and Canada; each removal resulting in layoffs of em-
ployees from the Waterbury plant. In March of 1961, for economic reasons, Lux
transferred two departments from the Waterbury plant to the Lebanon plant,
causing a susbtantial employee layoff at the Waterbury plant. In July of 1961,
the assets of the Lux Company 2 were acquired by the Robertshaw Controls Com-
pany. Thereafter, pursuant to the March layoff, the union and certain of its
individual members on behalf of themselves, brought an action in federal district
1. Hereinafter referred to as Lux.
2. Hereinafter referred to as Robertshaw.
